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Introduction 
Vulnerabilities often associated with ageing may challenge an individual’s ability to 
remain independent. In particular, it is common for the physical characteristics of 
home environments to become inappropriate, harder to navigate or even hazardous 
(Blackman, 2005). In the UK a key alternative to mainstream housing for older 
people, which is championed as safeguarding independence by providing care and 
support, is specialist housing. The two dominant types of specialist housing in the 
UK are ‘sheltered housing’ and ‘extra care housing’. Both facilitate independent living 
but incorporate different levels of care and support. ‘Retirement housing’ is another 
popular umbrella term, and the use of this term in recent years extends to housing 
schemes where minimal care and support is offered (such as some retirement 
villages).  
However, given their role in providing care and support in order to maintain 
independence for those who have some level of care need, sheltered and extra care 
housing play a central role in the continuum of care in later life (Nocon and Pleace, 
1999; Heywood et al., 2001, Croucher et al., 2007, Darton et al, 2008, Pannell et al, 
2012). The importance attached to the role of sheltered and extra care housing in 
government policy has shifted throughout the latter decades of the twentieth century 
to the present. Promoted in the 1960s and 1970s, as providing a cheaper and more 
independent alternative to residential care homes, government support for specialist 
housing reduced in the 1990s as providing care in people's existing home became a 
priority under the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 (Nocon and Pleace, 1999; 
Heywood et al., 2001; Darton and Smith, 2017). 
Although government support for specialist housing declined in the 1990s, the initial 
entry of the private sector during the 1980s led to an over-supply of retirement 
housing (Oldman, 1990; Balchin and Rhoden, 2002). In late 1980s - early 1990s, 
Oldman (1990) estimated that there were just over 500,000 specialist housing units 
in England and Wales. However, recent data indicates that the quantity of retirement 
housing has remained relatively static (Pannell et al., 2012; Best and Porteus, 2016). 
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Indeed, a shortage of supply relative to demand is now widely noted, even at a 
government level (Select Committee on Public Services and Demographic Change, 
2013) and it has even been calculated that there could be a shortfall in retirement 
housing of around 160,000 by 2030 and 376,000 by 2050 (International Longevity 
Centre, 2016).  
While there are many underlying reasons that contribute to the current lack of supply 
of specialist housing, there exists no comprehensive critical review of the reasons 
behind these issues. This purpose of this paper is to begin to address this gap. 
Firstly, patterns of tenure and the market share for social and private sectors is 
outlined in order to provide a portrait of the market that the paper proceeds to 
critically review.  
Current tenure patterns and providers 
Around three quarters of specialist housing for older people is for rent and a quarter 
is for sale. Pannell et al. (2012) observ  this is the reverse tenure pattern seen 
among older people in mainstream housing. Ninety percent of specialist housing is 
classified as housing with support (sheltered), and 10% as housing and care (extra 
care). With there being 7.3 million older households, the specialist housing supply 
amounts to 73 units per 1,000 older households. Housing associations (59%) and 
local authorities (24%) mostly allocate this accommodation, with a small number held 
for shared ownership. The private sector offers a smaller quantity (10%), almost 
exclusively offered for sale on leasehold tenures. The private sector offers ‘housing 
with support’, whilst most ‘housing with care’ schemes are located in the social 
sector (Poole, 2006). Almshouses, charitable/non-profit providers and co-operatives 
(7%) also offer some specialist accommodation (Pannell et al., 2012). 
Building rates and the wider policy climate  
Local authorities 
Since 2010, the total number of local authority new builds has been around 1,500 
per year in England (Perry, 2014). While local authorities build relatively few homes - 
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including specialist retirement housing - they are widely seen as being in a position 
to increase supply. However, government priorities appear to have curtailed the 
ability of many local authorities that would be willing to engage in more substantial 
building programmes (Local Government Association, 2015).  
Local authority debt is regarded as overall government debt. A key aim of successive 
governments has been debt reduction and austerity. To this end, the Localism Act 
2011 set a cap on local authority borrowing levels for house building (HM 
Government, 2011). This cap prohibits local authorities from raising sufficient capital 
for building despite local authorities having an approximately 50% lower gearing ratio 
than housing associations (Perry, 2014), which means that local authorities have a 
significantly better debt to equity ratio per dwelling on their balance sheets than 
housing associations.  
During the 1990s and 2000s, many local authorities set up housing associations for 
the purpose of transferring their housing stock and to stimulate building programmes 
which they could not do themselves. However, it has now reached the point where 
local authorities build and manage few properties.  
Housing Associations 
Housing associations use local authority banding systems to allocate housing, 
although a small number of schemes take direct applications from outside of the 
local authority system (FirstStop, 2013, Age UK, 2016). For those who are 
considered a low priority for social housing, direct applications reflect an important 
means of seeking and accessing alternative housing (FirstStop, 2013, Age UK, 
2016). However, similar to local authority housing, in recent years housing 
associations have developed long waiting lists (Age UK, 2016). 
Considering their market share exceeds 50% (Pannell et al., 2012), housing 
associations should represent an important source of new specialist housing builds. 
Furthermore, housing associations are regarded by some as in a particularly strong 
position to meet need. As Best and Porteus (2016: 7) note in a report for the All 
Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Housing and Care for Older People, housing 
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associations "...face reduced risks as they have the flexibility to build retirement 
housing for sale but to switch to renting the properties if there is a downturn in the 
market." However, while it may be attractive to suggest housing associations should 
be able to meet the need for specialist retirement housing, there are many reasons 
why housing associations are currently struggling to do so. 
Firstly, the sector does not operate like commercial developers and this has 
ramifications for both how land is accessed, and the quantity and quality of that land. 
Secondly, in a similar way to those experienced by local authorities, recent reforms 
are significantly limiting housing associations’ ability to maintain their original 
mission, presenting critical problems for the expansion of social housing - including 
retirement housing. 
While competitively bidding for land marks the primary process through which private 
land developers acquire land, this is less common for housing associations. As 
housing associations are social providers and do not seek to make significant profits 
from their tenants, they also have to keep outgoings as low as possible. This has 
ramifications for how housing associations operate. Housing associations obtain land 
by being given it by local authorities or by working in partnership with developers. 
Another source is to procure land cheaply from private developers that would not 
otherwise be acceptable for residential planning purposes - for example, via section 
106 agreements (based on that section of The 1990 Town & Country Planning Act) 
(Monk et al., 2008). 
Not having the ‘financial muscle’ of private developers inhibits the ability of housing 
associations to purchase land on the open-market. Furthermore, a partial reliance on 
state grants (which have been in continual decline), and being tied more widely to 
governmental policies and priorities, present a challenging climate for housing 
associations in relation to expanding their housing stock. Indeed, as Walker (2014) 
outlines, some housing associations are inactive and do not build. 
While the current position of housing associations is not conducive to substantively 
expanding their stock, the policies and priorities of central government are also 
presenting particularly challenging circumstances for housing associations if they are 
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to be a significant source of new build social specialist retirement housing. This is 
particularly so as the start-up costs of specialist retirement housing can be high 
(Balchin and Rhoden, 2002). 
Recent reform and the demise of the traditional housing association model 
The landscape for Housing Associations has changed and continues to change 
dramatically. Government capital grants in the 1990s made up around 75% of  
funding including land acquisition and development costs (Wilson et al, 2018). 
However, as a consequence of austerity, capital grants have been in continual 
decline and in recent years constitute only around 14% of funding (Cross, 2017, 
Haigh, 2015, Wiles, 2015). However, even with access to grants, schemes will 
invariably not breakeven for decades (Parr, 2015). 
Access to grants is contingent on political priorities. For example, the Department of 
Health grants that spearheaded many extra care developments in the sector after 
2000 are no longer accessible (Pannell et al., 2012), despite evidence that these 
forms of supported housing saves NHS resources (Croucher et al., 2007; Darton et 
al., 2008; Kneale, 2011; Best and Porteus, 2016). 
Consequently, there has been a continual shift away from government capital grants 
funding to revenue-based funding and private borrowing, with all the implications that 
this has for housing associations’ balance sheets – namely, repaying loans often at 
high levels of interest (Haigh, 2015). For example, under successive New Labour 
governments, Housing Associations could expect to receive grants of £30-40,000 
per unit (for mainstream dwellings). However, the Coalition Government between 
2010 and 2015 made substantial changes. In relation to housing associations, the 
coalition introduced a new third tier of housing - social (at 60% market rent), 
'affordable (at 80% market rent) and market rent (100% market rent). Capital grants 
were also replaced with subsidies, typically around £8-12,000 per unit (Haigh, 2015, 
Williams & Whitehead, 2015, Housing Association Chief Executive, personal 
communication).  
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While initial grants were reduced, future income was to be secured by the guarantee 
of raising rents by 1% above inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index. 
With fewer grants, many housing associations needed to borrow against future 
income, and subsequently this triggered a rise in building 'affordable' housing (with 
80% rent levels, as opposed to 60%). These circumstances underpinned many 
housing association long term funding models, business plans and strategies. This is 
predicted to equate to a 12% loss in predicted income for housing associations, with 
one national leading association forecasting a reduction in income of £34m between 
2016 and 2020 (Stonewater, 2016). 
Alongside this, it was announced by DCLG (2016) that social landlords were not 
permitted to increase rents by CPI+1%, but instead were to reduce their rent by 1% 
annually for the subsequent 4 years (Wilson, 2016b). With fewer grants, and private 
finance tending to have been secured against future rental income, reducing rather 
than increasing rents the ability of housing associations to raise capital for new 
building programmes is reduced (Haigh, 2015; Darton and Smith, 2017).  
Some housing associations have also merged in order to become lower risk to their 
investors and also to pool resources (Haigh, 2015). Yet, mergers are not always 
positive solutions, with a merger between two major housing associations failing to 
complete because of disagreements over future mergers (Brown, 2016). 
Current grant levels and the challenges to current funding means that interest on 
private capital rapidly brings housing associations to their debt ceiling. Some of the 
more radical suggestions to address this problem have suggested that housing 
associations should continue to diversify and increase the amount f homes they sell 
or rent at market rates, thereby increasing revenue streams and reducing 
dependency on government grants and unsustainable levels of private borrowing 
(Walker, 2014).  
Data from the National Housing Federation outlines how 18% of the 40,124 total 
homes built by housing associations during 2015-2016 were for market sale or rent. 
Although comparable data for the previous year is not available, it indicates that 
building nearly a fifth of their total build for market sale or rent may signify some 
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degree of diversification. However, as others have noted, deprioritising social 
housing has a detrimental effect on the common identity and critically and 
strategically important working relationship between housing associations and local 
authorities (Heywood, 2015) - more so on those requiring their services. This 
financially challenging climate has also seen some housing associations abandon 
their original mission to provide affordable social housing and de-register their 
charitable status to become providers of private housing sold at market rates 
(Murtha, 2015).  
Demonstrating the reach of neoliberal free market ideology, it has been suggested 
that building ‘affordable’ units is a critical problem. Doing so reduces the return on 
investment, reduces profitability and in some cases reduces the likelihood of 
accessing capital from lenders to even build in the first place. On this basis, Ball 
(2011) argues that in effect ‘affordable’ housing becomes a levy that is a barrier 
toward adequate supply. Lifting the need to build ‘affordable’, in theory, would lead to 
an increase in building rates and would drive down price as normative market 
practices incentives would be restored.  
Welfare reform 
Continuing austerity measures, welfare reform, and particularly housing benefit 
reform, also present additional uncertainties to tenants’ income, and, concomitantly, 
housing association revenue streams, maintaining existing provision and their 
abilities to build (Mendoza, 2015). Suggested reforms outline that housing costs (i.e. 
rent and service charges), previously paid for by Housing Benefit, will be paid under 
Universal Credit, but only up to one bedroom on the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) 
rate only. The LHA rate is linked to the private rental market, and capped at the 30th 
percentile and is subject to significant regional variation which are estimated to be 
greater than the variation of housing costs in supported housing (Homeless Link and 
Supported Housing Alliance, 2017). The National Housing Federation (2016) 
projects that this would mean, on average, tenants (including sheltered and extra 
care tenants) will have £68 a week less to pay for care, support staff and service 
charges, and this would make many current and prospective schemes financially 
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unviable. Indeed, some housing associations have shelved plans to build specialist 
housing (Buchanan, 2016; Darton and Smith, 2017).  
In existing schemes, a key concern is whether reductions and/or uncertainties in 
income for both residents and providers will provide adequate resources to maintain 
services. It is noted, however, that there has been a continual decline in services and 
particularly support staff in recent years (King et al., 2009). Evidence suggests that 
reductions in support staff is likely to have a detrimental impact on the community 
cohesion of developments (Gray, 2014) and loneliness and isolation of residents 
(Gray, 2017; Gray & Worlledge, 2018) – or many of the characteristics that draws 
older people to specialist housing. 
Housing benefit reform is therefore another factor that is contributing to wider 
uncertainty within the sector and especially to those seeking specialist 
accommodation. The unforeseen consequences of policy reform, and pervasive 
neoliberal market ideology, have created a complex uncertain situation for older 
people seeking specialist housing and those who currently reside within the sector. 
Given the substantive issues the social sector has faced in recent years, for many 
the private sector constitutes an important option. Yet, the private market for 
specialist housing in later life also has substantial supply side issues - particularly 
around transparency and trust and limited reach because of people’s differential 
incomes.  
 
Private sector 
Some suggest that what is estimated to only be around 25,000 bed spaces, or 
approximately 10% of the market (Pannell et al., 2012), is an indication that the 
private market has yet to 'take off' (Parr, 2015). A relatively small number of private 
firms operate in this market place (for example, McCarthy & Stone and Churchill), 
and many providers of mainstream housing have not yet entered the specialist 
housing market, mainly because of cost. Private developers tend to target people 
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with lower levels of physical and health needs, primarily because less capital 
investment is needed. Therefore, there has been a tendency for private 
developments not to have on-site services, though some private providers in recent 
years have marketed extra care schemes. However, many private developments 
require services and facilities that more central and expensive locations offer. This 
has an implication for the price of land, and indeed many private providers compete 
with more mainstream developers (Parr, 2015).  
High initial capital outlay also has implications for the intensive and often undesirable 
models that private organisations promote. However, as wider evidence suggests, 
the leasehold tenures offered by the private sector often tend to be undesirable, 
unresponsive and even untrustworthy (Hodgkinson, 2015). As the following sections 
highlight there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that these concerns have wider 
foundations. 
Leasehold and fees  
Specialist accommodation available from private providers tends to be offered on a 
leasehold tenure, which are associated with apartment style accommodation (in 
England and Wales) where there are shared common areas (such as entrance ways, 
hallways and stairs), physical structures of the building (walls, roofing and floors) and 
sometimes facilities (such as laundry rooms and gardens). In properties such as 
these, the behaviours of residents can have a direct impact on the other residents’ 
safety, physical and social wellbeing. Consequently, arrangements have developed 
to address the respective collective rights and responsibilities of owners and 
management moving into an instrumental management or processing of people 
(Cole and Robinson, 2000). 
While the freeholder owns the plot, leaseholders purchase temporary rights of 
occupation that usually last for long periods of time. In relation to any communal 
areas, facilities and physical structures, which are owned by the freeholder, the 
freeholder usually levies a service charge for maintenance purposes at his 
discretion. This can mean that leaseholders have little voice or control over the 
management and maintenance of properties, but are nevertheless liable to 
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reimburse outgoings. In short, residents are technically owners but can experience 
the relative powerlessness and rights of being a tenant. Cole and Robinson (2000), 
reflect the dichotomy of ownership on the one hand but with monthly rents payable to 
a freeholder on the other (or appointed management agent), describing leaseholders 
as ‘owners yet tenants’.  
In specialist retirement housing, this situation tends to be exacerbated to the further 
detriment of leaseholders and the financial gain of freeholders. Freeholders, 
particularly those in the private sector have also tended to charge what are 
collectively known as 'event fees'. These are the fees that companies who own and 
manage retirement properties, i.e. the freeholder, include in clauses of lease 
agreements. For example, clauses often require owners to pay a fee, up to 30% of 
the resale value, if the owners wish to sell or sublet their home. Other examples of 
‘events’ where fees are levied are if a relative or partner moves in, a spouse dies a 
property is inherited or even a change in occupation (Wilson, 2016a). 
Legal investigations around fairness of fees 
Older people entering the private retirement housing market commonly tie up equity. 
Many older households have paid off any mortgage and, on this basis, experience a 
relatively low cost of living in relation to their outgoings. Yet, in contrast, there is 
significant variation in on-going costs of living in retirement housing. Examples of on-
going costs include maintenance, management and leasehold fees, with such costs 
compounded by those negatively impacted on by changes of housing benefit (Age 
UK, 2012, Pannell and Blood, 2012, National Housing Federation, 2016). In many 
cases, the extent and nature of these costs will be new, sometimes perceived as 
hidden, and certainly unwelcomed (Age UK, 2012, Hodgkinson, 2015).  
Concerns have been raised about the transparency of costs and clauses in 
leasehold contracts, including questions of their legality in relation to the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (Wilson, 2016a). The Office of Fair 
Trading investigated between 2009 and 2013 and recommended legislative change. 
Their report concluded that "...legislative reform be considered by expanding the 
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remit of the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal to allow the tribunal to rule on the 
reasonableness of all transfer fees." (Office of Fair Trading, 2013: 63) 
While the Office of Fair Trading did not mount a legal challenge based on their 
recommendations, they did reach an agreement with large providers - such as 
McCarthy & Stone - to drop some of these fees and replace them with flat fees and 
agree other changes, thus "...mitigating what we consider to be their inherent 
unfairness” (Office of Fair Trading, 2013, pp. 57). However, the report did produce 
some guidelines. Among the recommendations to increase transparency were 
limiting any fees to actual final sales values and not using the open-market as the 
basis for calculating fees (Office of Fair Trading, 2013). The recommendations 
suggest that the nature of leasehold tends to commodify not only housing stock but 
also those who use it and therefore acts to instrumentalise housing supply in favour 
of the profit motive and the focus on the person and her or his needs and voice is 
largely ignored. 
Low transparency and trust limiting growth of the sector 
Issues of this nature and the poor reputation of management firms who operate in 
the leasehold market have even led to some companies rebranding in attempts to 
dissociate themselves with their previous histories. However, others suggest the role 
of fees, which have undoubtedly led to feelings of distrust by many, are not the 
central problem (Hodgkinson, 2015). 
In a market-driven system, fees constitute important revenue streams for new builds, 
and this is seen as particularly important for a market where there is chronic 
shortage of supply with high start-up costs (Select Committee on Public Services 
and Demographic Change, 2013). In effect, it is the marketised system that 
constitutes the problem. However, a further critical problem is that there is a lack of 
transparency regarding the levying of fees - particularly exit fees – alongiside the 
neoliberal market system itself. These fees tend to be perceived as unwelcome and 
have a negative impact on the ability of people to manage their finances. A market-
oriented solution has been proposed that an exit fee is built into the price an 
individual pays at the start rather than exiting the property: 
Page 11 of 21 Housing, Care and Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Housing, Care and Support
"...the option for purchasers to pay these fees upfront, rather than upon the 
sale or reassignment of the property, would not reduce an income stream for 
the developers but it would give another option to potential leaseholders who 
want to have greater control over their finances." (Hillier, 2016) 
However, the Law Commission, following up on the Office for Fair Trading 
investigation (mentioned above), did not recommend upfront payments in order to 
aid transparency. Rather, it recommend providing more transparent information 
around the nature and disclosure of fees and to limit them to periods around sale, 
sub-letting or change of occupancy (The Law Commission, 2017). 
Fairer and less opaque practices in this area reflect the wider desire and need for 
more transparency in the whole sector (Age UK, 2012). Indeed, such is the extent of 
the sector’s poor reputation, it is seen as a factor in limiting its growth. Implicit in this 
proposition is that transparency and more transparent market practices will lead to 
increases in consumer confidence, and ultimately trust (Hillier, 2016, Galvin, 2016). 
The underlying market-driven approach is not, however, criticized or challenged. 
Future debate is needed in this area. 
Reform and moves toward ‘commonhold’ 
Another cause of dispute in relation to leasehold is owners’ lack of control over 
communal charges and their precariousness (Standing, 2011). These charges refer 
to the on-going costs of maintenance and general upkeep of properties, including the 
provision of support staff. Similar to poor transparency around 'event fees', many 
freeholders of specialist older people’s housing use companies in which they have a 
financial interest, and use them to elicit more money from the leaseholders 
(Hodgkinson, 2015). Such exploitative practices in relation to leasehold are not new, 
of course, and historically there have been strong criticisms of leasehold and many 
unsuccessful attempts at enfranchisement reform dating back to the 1880s. In recent 
decades in the UK there have been some attempt to move towards collective 
enfranchisement – or reforms akin to legislation in the USA and France where 
statutory systems safeguard the individual interest of owners (leaseholders), where 
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co-operative and common management schemes have a statutory footing (Cole and 
Robinson, 2000). 
The Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 made provision 
for leaseholders to exercise the right to purchase the freehold, subject to agreement 
of all participating tenants. However, the changes made to the Bill through its 
parliamentary journey were heavily influenced by the interests of existing capital and 
landowners (i.e. freeholders) and costs of collective enfranchisement were raised – 
in effect making the pursuit of collective enfranchisement unlikely and subsequently 
rarely exercised (Cole and Robinson, 2000). 
As an alternative to purchasing the freehold, since 2002 leaseholders do have the 
option of effectively taking over the 'right to manage'. If more than 50% of 
leaseholders in a development agree they can, under The Commonhold and 
Leasehold Reform Act 2002, create a company whose members can make their own 
decisions about management, upkeep of properties, insurance, repairs and service 
charges (DCLG, 2005). The legislation introduced a new type of legal estate known 
as 'commonhold'. 
While currently only a small number of properties have them, commonhold tenures 
have been suggested as a desirable alternative to leasehold in the retirement 
housing sector (Age UK, 2012) and there has even been some debate in Parliament 
whether to outlaw leasehold and substitute it with commonhold (Fitzpatrick and 
Blackman-Woods, 2015). However, while no data exists to our knowledge on the 
uptake of commonhold or the ‘right to manage’ in specialist housing, whether this is 
realistic or even desirable for older people (some of whom may have health or care 
needs) is questionable. 
With leasehold still featuring many of its feudal characteristics, questions asked by 
Cole and Robinson (2000: 611) nearly two decades ago remain largely unanswered: 
“It remains to be seen whether the distribution of rights and responsibilities in the 
leasehold sector can be reformed, to be more closely aligned with common practice 
for flat ownership and managementO”  
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Unresolved tensions 
There is a critical conflict between the key social purpose of specialist housing (i.e. 
living independent of socially provided care) and the values that underpin provision 
and ultimately limit the quantity of units in both the social and private sector.  
In the social sector, which accounts for around three-quarters of specialist housing, 
government priorities currently act as significant barriers to the building of new 
housing stock. On the other hand, the private sector has reduced the individual older 
person to a commodified actor who is attracted for economic purposes and not 
served according to needs. The insecure and uncertain aspects of the individual’s 
financial state, entitlement to benefits and vulnerability to a precarious future drives a 
further wedge into a system that preys upon such insecurities for its core driver, 
whether that be balancing the books, value-for-money or profit.  
Conclusion 
As this supply-side review has presented, the specialist housing market has an array 
of issues that does not support its central purpose to allow older people to remain 
independent. The structural and philosophical approach to housing provision 
remains embedded within a market-driven culture that puts business above 
individual need. 
Increases in supply along with more transparent, fairer and responsive market 
practices would, in theory, lead to increases in engagement, confidence, trust and 
ultimately growth. Doing so will require substantial levels of economic and, 
importantly, political and social capital beyond existing resource levels. Yet, it is not 
as straightforward as suggesting more quantity will lead to a market that is more 
accessible. Schemes need to reflect what existing evidence suggest residents’ 
desire – independence, security, peace of mind, continuity of support/care, 
neighbourly and social atmospheres, transparent contracts and not having to take 
responsibility for repairs and maintenance (Callaghan, 2008; Croucher et al., 2006; 
National Housing Federation, 2010).  
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While this article has focused on the supply side dynamics of the specialist housing 
market, it will be followed up with research documenting the demand-side - older 
people’s experiences of engaging with this market - in the form of a realist evaluation 
of a housing options service for older people considering specialist housing (authors 
et al., 2018). 
 
 
References 
Age UK. (2012), Making it Work for Us: A residents’ inquiry into sheltered and 
retirement housing, Age UK, London. 
Age UK. (2016) Factsheet 8: Council and housing association housing, Age UK, 
London.  
Balchin, P. N. & Rhoden, M. (2002) Housing Policy: An Introduction, Routledge, 
London. 
Ball, M. (2011) Housing markets and independence in old age: expanding the 
opportunities. Henley Business School, University of Reading. 
Best, R. & Porteus, J. (2016) Housing our Ageing Population: Positive Ideas HAPPI 
3, Housing & Care 21, Birmingham. 
Blackman, T. (2005) Health risks and health inequalities in housing : an assessment 
tool, Department of Health, London. 
Brown, C. (2016) “Genesis and TVH 'disagreed over further mergers'. Inside 
Housing”, available at:: https://www.insidehousing.co.uk/news/news/genesis-
and-tvh-disagreed-over-further-mergers-47922 (accessed 19 January 2017). 
Page 15 of 21 Housing, Care and Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Housing, Care and Support
Buchanan, M. (2016) Sheltered housing developments 'shelved due to benefit cuts'. 
BBC News, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35583415 (accessed 
17 March 2016). 
Callaghan, L. (2008) Social well-being in Extra Care Housing: An overview of the 
literature. PSSRU Discussion Paper No. 2528. Personal Social Services 
Research Unit, University of Kent, Canterbury. 
Cole, I. & Robinson, D. (2000) “Owners yet Tenants: The Position of Leaseholders in 
Flats in England and Wales”, Housing Studies, Vol 15 No. 2, pp. 595 - 612. 
Cross, L. (2017) “Do housing associations have the appetite to detach themselves 
from central grant funding, asks David Blackman”, Social Housing, available 
at: https://www.socialhousing.co.uk/news/news/analysis-taken-for-granted-
49455 (accessed 09/07/2018). 
Croucher, K, Hicks, L, Bevan, M and Sanderson, D .(2007) Comparative evaluation 
of models of housing with care for later life, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
York. 
Darton, R., Bäumker, T., Callaghan, L., Holder, J., Netten, A. and Towers, A. (2008) 
Evaluation of the Extra Care Housing Funding Initiative: Initial Report. PSSRU 
Discussion Paper No. 2506/2. Personal Social Services Research Unit, 
University of Kent, Canterbury. 
 
Darton, R. and Smith, R. (2017) “Trends in Commissioning Arrangements for 
Housing with Care”, in British Society of Gerontology Annual Conference 
2017: “Do Not Go Gentle” – Gerontology and a Good Old Age, 2017 Swansea 
University, p. 59. 
Firststop (2013). Shelterd housing: Renting for people who may be considered a low 
priority, Elderly Accommodation Counsel, London. 
Page 16 of 21Housing, Care and Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Housing, Care and Support
FItzpatrick, J. & Blackman-Woods, R. 2015. Notice of Amendments 3 December 
2015: Housing and Planning Bill. London: House of Commons Public Bill 
Committee Amendments. 
 
Galvin, J. (2016) Fees on Transfer of Title, Change of Occupancy and Other Event: 
Response to the Law Commission, Elderly Accommodation Counsel,  
London. 
 
Gray, A. (2014) "Care in the community or care of the community? Some 
reflections on the role of support services in retirement housing", Housing, 
Care and Support, Vol. 17 Issue: 2, pp.75-
83, https://doi.or /10.1108/HCS-03-2014-0007. 
 
Gray, A. (2017) "Preventing isolation in sheltered housing: challenges in an era 
of reduced support funding", Working with Older People, Vol. 21 Issue: 
3, pp.186-194, https://doi.org/10.1108/WWOP-05-2017-0011. 
 
Gray, A. & Worlledge. G. (2018) “Addressing loneliness and isolation in retirement 
housing”, Ageing and Society, Vol 38, Issue: 3, pp. 615-644,   DOI: 
10.1017/S0144686X16001239 
 
 
Haigh, A. (2015) UK Residential: The Future of Housing Association Development. 
Chapman Taylor. 
 
Authors,. (2018). Efficacy of Telephone Information and Advice on Welfare: the Need 
for Realist Evaluation Social Policy & Society, 17, 1, 1-21.  
 
Heywood, A. (2015) Working together - thinking alike: what do councils and local 
enterprise partnerships expect from housing associations, The Smith Institute, 
London. 
 
Page 17 of 21 Housing, Care and Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Housing, Care and Support
Heywood, F., Oldman, C. & Means, R. (2001) Housing and Home in Later Life, Open 
University Press, Philadelphia. 
Hillier, A. (2016) “Building Fairness in Leasehold Retirement Housing - Charges and 
Fees”, available at: http://www.firststopcareadvice.org.uk/building-fairness-in-
leasehold-retirement-housing-charges-and-fees/ (accessed 28 October 2016). 
HM Government (2011) Localism Act 2011 Chapter 20, TSO, London. 
Hodgkinson, L. (2015) "The hidden costs of retirement properties”, The Telegraph, 
available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/goodlife/11510002/Should-you-really-
buy-a-retirement-property.html (Accessed 20 May 2015). 
Homeless Link and Supported Housing Alliance. (2017) Parliamentary Briefing: 
Supported Housing Funding Changes, June 2017, Homeless Link, 
London. 
 
International Longevity Centre (2016) The State of the Nation's Housing, ILC, 
London 
Kneale, D. (2011), Establishing the extra in Extra Care Perspectives from three Extra 
Care Housing Providers, International Longevity Centre, London. 
 
Local Government Association (2015) Review of the Local Authority role in housing 
supply. Evidence from the Local Government Association, Local Government 
Association, London. 
Mendoza, K-A. (2015) Austerity: The demolition of the welfare state and the rise of 
the zombie economy, New Internationalist Publications Ltd, Oxford. 
Monk, S., Whitehead, C. & Martindale, K. (2008) Increasing Housing Supply, 
Communities and Local Government & CCHPR, London. 
Page 18 of 21Housing, Care and Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Housing, Care and Support
Murtha, T. (2015) “The housing association that will no longer build homes for the 
poor”, The Guardian Housing Network, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2015/aug/07/housing-
asssociation-no-longer-build-homes-poor-genesis (accessed 9 December 
2015). 
National Housing Federation (2010), More than just a few kind words; Reshaping 
support in sheltered housing: a good practice guide for housing providers and 
local a thorities, NHF, London  
National Housing Federation (2016) “Older people, disabled people and most 
vulnerable to lose £68 a week in housing benefit”, available at: 
http://www.housing.org.uk/press/press-releases/older-people-disabled-
people-and-most-vulnerable-to-lose-68-a-week/ (accessed 26 January 2016). 
Nocon, A. & Pleace, N. (1999) “Sheltered housing and community care”, Social 
Policy and Administration, Vol 33 No. 2, pp. 164-180. 
Office of Fair Trading (2013) OFT investigation into retirement home transfer fee 
terms: A report on the OFT's findings, Office of Fair Trading, London. 
Oldman, C. (1990) Moving in old age : new directions in housing policies, HMSO, 
London. 
Pannell, J., Aldridge, H. & Kenway, P. (2012) Market Assessment of Housing 
Options for Older People, New Policy Institute, London. 
Pannell, J. & Blood, I. 2012. Supported Housing for older people in the UK: An 
evidence review. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
 
Parr, K. (2015) Strategic Housing Market Assessment: Housing with Care for Older 
People in Kent, Housing Learning and Improvement Network, London. 
Page 19 of 21 Housing, Care and Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Housing, Care and Support
Perry, J. (2014) Where is housing heading? Why is it important to change local 
authority borrowing rules?, Chartered Institute of Housing, London. 
Poole, T. (2006) Wanless Social Care Review: Housing Options for Older People, 
The King's Fund, London. 
Select Committee on Public Services and Demographic Change (2013) Ready for 
ageing? HL Paper 140 ed, TSO: London. 
Standing, G. (2011) The Precariat: The dangerous new class, Bloomsbury, London. 
Stonewater (2016) Stonewater: Strategic Plan 2016-2020, Stonewater, Leicester. 
The Law Commission (2017) Event Fees in Retirement Properties, The Law 
Commission, London. 
Walker, C. (2014) Freeing Housing Associations: Better financing, more homes, 
Policy Exchange, London. 
Wiles, C. (2015) “What is the government’s five-year vision for social housing?”, The 
Guardian Housing Network, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2015/jul/22/government-five-
year-vision-social-housing (accessed 9 December 2015). 
Williams, P. & Whitehead, C. (2015) Financing affordable social housing in the UK; 
building on success? Housing Finance International, pp. 14-19. ISSN 2078-
6328 
Wilson, W. (2016a). Leasehold retirement homes: exit/event fees, House of 
Commons Library, London. 
Wilson, W. (2016b) Rent Setting: social housing (England), House of Commons 
Library, London. 
Page 20 of 21Housing, Care and Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Housing, Care and Support
Wilson, W., Barton, C. & Smith, L. (2018) Tackling the under-supply of housing in 
England, , House of Commons Library, London. 
 
Page 21 of 21 Housing, Care and Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
